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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Spurred by relatively inexpensive and widely available retail
equipment and increased residential Internet penetration, consumer
demand for more wireless broadband options continues at a rapid rate.1
Now, with consumers increasingly looking for mobile Internet
interconnectivity over greater distances and with greater flexibility,
technology companies are pushing the next generation of wireless
broadband technologies with the promise of freeing consumers from
location-based Internet access.2 These newer technologies can provide
robust video and audio capabilities, such as digital television, on-demand
video, and VoIP on a variety of digital devices.3 Yet, the rise of wireless
∗

Renee Dopplick earned her J.D. at the Georgetown University Law Center.
Cf. CTIA, The Wireless Association: Wireless Quick Facts,
http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)
(showing the increase in wireless penetration from 1995 to 2008).
2
See LINDA K. MOORE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY AND
SPECTRUM DEMAND: ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES 3 (2006); Wireless Innovation
Alliance, http://www.wirelessinnovationalliance.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2008)
(discussing a coalition of technology and public interest groups focused on expanding
wireless broadband access).
3
Id. VoIP refers to Voice over Internet Protocol. Id. at 3.
1
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broadband networks and the roll-out of new technologies pose new public
policy and regulatory challenges for spectrum management.4 If these
issues are not addressed, rather than yielding ultimately beneficial private,
public, and commercial uses of spectrum, the result could be detrimental
frequency interference with negative impacts on equipment functionality,
the integrity and reliability of networks, and the quality of service for
spectrum-dependent commercial services.5
[2] To address some of these issues in the United States, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) established the Wireless Broadband
Access Task Force in 2004 to assess and recommend how to increase
wireless broadband penetration in cost-effective and efficient ways.6 The
Task Force concluded that universal wireless broadband access will
depend on unlicensed mass-market consumer devices and greater
spectrum access for such devices.7 The Task Force recommended that the
FCC: (a) continue and expand spectrum access by unlicensed devices; (b)
consider increased power limits by unlicensed devices to permit greater
range from Internet access points; (c) promote voluntary industry
cooperation to mitigate potential interference among consumer devices;
and (d) work closely with industry to address intentional regulatory
violations that cause detrimental interference.8 Most consumers and
technology groups support the Task Force’s recommendations because
increased spectrum access could foster market competition and thus
4

See Memorandum on the Spectrum Policy for the 21st Century, 1 PUB. PAPERS 605
(May 29, 2003) (“The existing legal and policy framework for spectrum management has
not kept pace with the dramatic changes in technology and spectrum use.”).
5
Cf. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Silicon
Flatirons Telecommunications Program at the University of Colorado at Boulder:
Broadband Migration III: New Directions in Wireless Policy (Oct. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp212.html (discussing changes in the
role of interference in spectrum policy).
6
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell
Announces Formation of Wireless Broadband Access Task Force (May 5, 2004); Press
Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Wireless Broadband Access Task Force Seeks Public
Comment on Issues Related to Commission’s Wireless Broadband Policies (May 5,
2004).
7
See WIRELESS BROADBAND ACCESS TASK FORCE, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N,
CONNECTED & ON THE GO: BROADBAND GOES WIRELESS 5-8 (2005) (calling for
“innovative” regulatory approaches).
8
Id. at 5-6.
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promote innovative, low-cost, and high-speed wireless communications
and consumer equipment options.9
[3] In action consistent with the Task Force’s recommendation to increase
spectrum access for wireless broadband devices, the FCC voted
unanimously on November 4, 2008 to allow “new, sophisticated”
unlicensed devices to operate on a shared, secondary basis in unused
broadcasting spectrum.10 The unused spectrum, commonly referred to as
“white spaces,” will become available upon the transition to digital
television scheduled to occur on February 17, 2009.11 The ruling allows
for fixed and mobile wireless broadband devices for consumers and
businesses.12 To address the concerns of commercial operators that such
shared-spectrum devices may cause interference with licensed services,13
the ruling imposes stricter regulatory approval requirements for sharedspectrum devices.14 All devices must have geolocation ability, spectrum9

See Comments of The New America Foundation Consumers Union et al. at 2, 25-26,
In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186,
02-380 (Apr. 17, 2003) (endorsing the allocation of more unlicensed spectrum and
sharing in licensed spectrum).
10
In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186,
02-380, (Nov. 14, 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-260A1.pdf; see also Press
Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Adopts Rules for Unlicensed Use of Television
White Spaces (Nov. 4, 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-286566A1.pdf (announcing the
unanimous adoption of the Second Report and Order FCC 08-260)
11
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996),
amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309) (implementing FCC rules to require digital terrestrial
broadcasts by February 17, 2009).
12
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 10.
13
Leaders of News Corp., Disney, CBS, and NBC Universal wrote to the FCC Chairman
in 2007 to recommend that unlicensed mobile devices should not be allowed in the digital
television band due to their potential to cause harmful interference, including possible
“permanent damage” to licensed services. See, e.g., John Eggerton, Network Chiefs
Oppose Mobile Unlicensed Devices: Big Four Heads Write FCC Chairman Martin,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 10, 2007, available at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6488840.html?industryid=47171&q=Netw
ork+Chiefs+Oppose.
14
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, supra note 10.
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sensing technology to find available spectrum, and Internet access to a
centralized database of incumbent licensees to determine which spectrum
may be used by the unlicensed device at that location.15 The FCC will test
and certify devices in the laboratory.16 For devices relying solely on
spectrum-sensing technologies, the FCC will test the devices in both the
laboratory and real-world settings.17 If an approved device causes harmful
interference once on the market, the FCC asserts that it will act promptly
to remove such equipment from the market and will require the
responsible parties to remedy any interference.18
[4] Because legal enforcement to halt interference relies on individual
consumers ceasing to operate the devices, commercial operators worry
that after-the-fact enforcement to protect licensed services from
interference could prove time-consuming and inadequate, particularly if
the offending technology is on portable devices or becomes widespread in
the marketplace.19 Although the ruling asserts a right of FCC enforcement
action in the event of harmful interference, it does not guarantee
compensation to licensees or consumers of licensed services for outages or
degraded signal reception caused by offending unlicensed devices. The
ruling is also silent on consumer remedies, such as the right to
compensation, product return, or product exchange, should the unlicensed
15

See id.
See id.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See Joint Comments in Support of “Emergency Request” at 5, In re Unlicensed
Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices
Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Oct. 24,
2008), available at
http://www.nab.org/xert/corpcomm/pressrel/releases/102408_StateBroadcasters_WhiteSp
aces.pdf (“The Congress, the FCC, and very likely state and local law enforcement, will
be inundated with potentially millions of complaints from members of the public looking
for the causes of interference to their television sets.”); Reply Comments of MSTV and
NAB to OET Measurement Report on DTV Receiver Interference Rejection Capabilities
at 4, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for
Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186,
02-380 (May 15, 2007), available at
http://www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Filings1&CONTENTID=8338&TEMPL
ATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (arguing that interference from portable devices that can
be operated in and relocated to any geographical area will be difficult, if not nearly
impossible, to identify and to resolve the interference).
16
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devices cause harmful interference that renders them unlawful to operate.
[5] This article explores the impact on U.S. consumers when wireless
broadband devices interfere with or suffer interference from licensed and
unlicensed devices.
This interference causes degraded device
performance and makes devices unlawful to operate according to the FCC
regulations. First, the article briefly discusses the regulation of wireless
consumer devices in the United States. Specifically, the article addresses
consumer notification requirements regarding rights of use and states that
consumers have a duty to eliminate harmful interference. The article also
describes consumer rights and possible remedies when interference
renders equipment unusable or unlawful to operate.
[6] Next, the article compares the U.S. approach with the regulatory
approaches of Canada and the European Union, which rely on similar
technical interference standards.
The article then discusses how
interference from multiple wireless technologies and black-market devices
can impact consumer protections. The article explores the advantages and
limitations of possible market, regulatory, and legislative mechanisms
designed to enhance consumer protection. The article asserts that
consumers will benefit from a continued light regulatory approach for
unlicensed wireless devices.
Yet, emergent wireless broadband
technologies for consumer devices are challenging traditional notions of
spectrum management and how and when consumers may use unlicensed
devices. Thus, the article recommends greater consumer advocacy in the
regulatory process to ensure adequate consideration of consumer rights,
duties, and remedies when a wireless broadband device creates or suffers
from interference.
II. R EGULATION OF W IRELESS C ONSUMER D EVICES IN THE U NITED
S TATES
[7] Unlicensed wireless consumer devices sold in the United States are
permitted under 47 C.F.R. § 15, subject to the rules and minimum
technical performance specifications issued by the FCC.20 Consumers

20

See 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2008); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L TELECOMMS. &
INFO. ADMIN., MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES FOR FEDERAL RADIO
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT annex K (2008) (applying similar regulations and standards
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have been able to use unlicensed devices since 1934 due to a government
spectrum policy to “generally encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest” through flexible regulation of standardsbased devices.21 Assigned licenses can limit marketplace innovation,
competition, and efficient spectrum usage by creating barriers to entry and
conferring legal rights to a limited number of market actors.22 Because of
these limiting possibilities, the FCC has pursued a parallel public-interest
policy to allow non-exclusive and secondary spectrum access for
unlicensed devices, provided that these devices operate within permissible
frequencies and power rates. The FCC also prohibits such devices from
causing harmful interference to licensed services and devices.23 This
unlicensed regulatory approach supports shared usage and increases
spectrum access for multiple market actors. This approach, however, does
not recognize consumer rights to legal protections against interference
while operating unlicensed devices.
[8] In light of public policy goals that promote marketplace flexibility and
due to the absence of legal mechanisms to protect consumers from
unwanted interference, this section examines four aspects of the regulatory
principles and duties of the consumer under 47 C.F.R. § 15: (a) the
regulatory approach of devices for use in the residential environment; (b)
labeling and consumer notification requirements; (c) the consumer’s duty
to eliminate harmful interference; and (d) the remedies available to
consumers when equipment becomes unusable or unlawful to operate.
A. REGULATION OF UNLICENSED WIRELESS DEVICES IN RESIDENTIAL
ENVIRONMENTS
[9] License-exempt devices, referred to as unlicensed devices throughout,
are regulated under 47 C.F.R. § 15, which sets forth relevant
administrative, technical, and marketing rules.24 Nearly all consumer,
as Part 15 when the federal government devices interfere with federal uses of the
spectrum).
21
47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000).
22
See Harold Feld, From Third Class Citizen to First Among Equals: Rethinking the
Place of Unlicensed Spectrum in the FCC Hierarchy, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 53,
85-86 (2006).
23
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b); see also id. §§ 15.205, 15.209.
24
See id. § 15.1(a) (describing the scope of FCC regulations).
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retail wireless devices in the United States are regulated under 47 C.F.R. §
15 and thus do not require licensing.25 But in order to market or sell
unlicensed wireless devices in the United States, manufacturers must show
that devices comply with minimal performance standards established
under 47 C.F.R. § 15.26 Unlicensed equipment includes intentional,
unintentional, and incidental radio-frequency radiators.27 Many wireless
broadband technologies are designed to emit radio frequency energy;
therefore, “unlicensed devices” will be used throughout this article to refer
primarily to intentional radiators.28
[10] The FCC regulations located at 47 C.F.R. § 15 prioritize the
management of interference. The regulations achieve this objective by
dividing equipment into two major categories with different interference
standards: non-residential Class A and residential Class B equipment.29
Unlicensed devices designed for use in residential environments30 must
comply with interference standards under the FCC regulations.31 This
policy decision reflects two presumptions. First, residential devices likely
will be located closer together, which increases the risk of interference.
Second, manufacturers of low-cost, mass-market consumer devices lack
sufficient competitive incentives to include interference abatement beyond
the minimum regulatory limits.32 Accordingly, 47 C.F.R. § 15 defines
permissible frequency bands, restricts device power limits, and specifies
Manufacturers are
minimum operating performance standards.33
responsible for complying with 47 C.F.R. § 15 verification or certification
25

See id. § 15.1; id. § 15.3 (defining the devices regulated under Part 15).
See id. § 15.1(c) (requiring manufacturers of devices to comply with the administrative
and technical provisions of 47 C.F.R. § 15 before marketing the devices).
27
See id. § 15.1(a).
28
See id. § 15.3(n)-(o), (z).
29
See id. § 15.3(h)-(i).
30
See id. § 15.3(i).
31
See id. § 15.209.
32
See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review –
Conducted Emissions Limits Below 30 MHz for Equipment Regulated Under Parts 15
and 18 of the Commission’s Rules, ET Docket No. 98-80 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Engineering_Technology/Notices/1999/fcc99296.txt
(supporting continued regulation of unlicensed devices through a standards-based
approach).
33
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.202, 15.247; see also id. § 15.247 (discussing performance rules
relevant to wireless local area networks).
26
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requirements (depending on the type of device as specified in the
regulations) before marketing the equipment to consumers.34 This light
regulatory approach to the use of spectrum and devices aims to minimize
regulatory bureaucracy, thereby creating incentives for technological
innovation and encouraging market actors to negotiate efficient uses of
shared spectrum.35
B. MANDATORY LABELING AND CONSUMER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
[11] For residential consumer devices, the FCC regulations impose four
major mandatory labeling and notification requirements on
manufacturers.36 For most devices, the FCC's first requirement instructs
manufacturers to place a label on the device in a “conspicuous location,”
indicating that it complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15.37 The label may be either
a textual statement—“This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC
Rules”38—or, if the device is too small, an FCC-defined graphical
Manufacturers are required to provide compliance
identifier.39
information on the external product packaging only when the required
textual statement is not provided on the device or in the owner’s manual.40
Thus, the requirements permit manufacturers to provide compliance
information to the consumer inside the product packaging and after the
point of sale.
[12] Second, manufacturers must notify consumers in writing of their
limited rights when operating an unlicensed device.41 The required
34

See id. § 15.1.
See Kathleen Q. Abernathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 199, 205 (2002) (highlighting market-based advantages and consumer
benefits under the FCC’s regulatory approach to 47 C.F.R. § 15).
36
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19.
37
Id. § 15.19(a)(1). See also id. § 15.19(b)(1).
38
Id. § 15.19(a)(3). Compare id., with id. § 15.19(b)(1)-(4) (requiring a permanent label,
text, and the graphical identifier devices subject to Declaration of Conformity approval
but allowing some text to be placed in the owner's manual if the device is too small).
39
Id. § 15.19(a)(5).
40
The labeling information must be placed on the product, or, if that is impracticable, in
the instruction manual or on the device’s container. See id. Compliance labels must be
“readily visible” to the consumer at the time of purchase for devices subject to
Declaration of Conformity approval by the FCC. See id. § 15.19 (b)(1)-(4).
41
See id. § 15.19(a)(3), (a)(5).
35
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statement must affirm that the device complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15 and
that operation is subject to two conditions: “(1) This device may not cause
harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference
received, including interference that may cause undesired operation.”42
Logistically, this notification must be provided in one of three ways: (1)
on the device; (2) in a “prominent location in the instruction manual”
supplied to the consumer; or (3) “on the container in which the device is
marketed.”43
Accordingly, manufacturers may provide pre-sale
notification on the external product packaging,44 but, in practice, they
generally provide post-sale notification inside the packaging, typically in
the owner’s manual.45 The regulations allow the owner’s manual to be
included as a printed booklet, on a digital media disk, or on a
manufacturer’s website.46 In 2004, the FCC explained that online access
to manuals “will provide increased flexibility to manufacturers, result in
cost savings to the industry and could enhance access to the disabled
community because computers could ‘read’ information to the user or
magnify it for easier viewing.”47
[13] Third, consumers must be informed in the owner’s manual that any
modification to the unlicensed device voids regulatory compliance and
may preclude lawful use.48 The regulations do not require this notification
to appear on the label.49 In practice, the caution against device
modification by the consumer generally appears on the same page or in the
same section in the owner’s manual as the regulatory compliance
statement and statements regarding the prohibition of harmful interference

42

Id. § 15.19(a)(3); cf. id. § 15.19(a)(1) (requiring that “receivers associated with the
operation of a licensed radio service” provide notice to consumers that the operation
“does not cause harmful interference”).
43
Id. § 15.19(a)(3), (a)(5).
44
See id. § 15.19(a)(5).
45
See, e.g., Wii Operations Manual, available at
http://www.nintendo.com/consumer/downloads/WiiOpMn_setup.pdf.
46
47 C.F.R. § 15.21 (allowing manufacturers to provide information to the user through
“computer disk or over the Internet”).
47
Review of Part 15 and Other Parts of the Commission’s Rules, 19 F.C.C.R. 22311,
22312 (2004).
48
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.21.
49
See id.; see also id. § 15.19(a)(5) (enumerating specific requirements for consumer
notification).
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and risks of interference.50 Fourth, manufacturers must inform consumers
of the recommended steps to take to correct interference.51 This
requirement is discussed below, within the description of self-correction as
a potential remedy for consumers.52 Thus, 47 C.F.R. § 15 requires
manufacturers to provide compliance information on the device when
possible and additional information in the owner’s manual, including a
warning of potential interference with other devices, a statement to warn
against unauthorized modifications, and a list of recommended steps to
correct interference.
C. DUTY OF CONSUMER TO ELIMINATE HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
AND TO ACCEPT ANY INTERFERENCE
[14] Pursuant to required labeling language, consumers may operate an
unlicensed wireless broadband device as long as it “accept[s] any
interference received, including interference that may cause undesired
operation” and does not cause “harmful interference.”53 These critical
device limitations are sufficient to warrant special regulatory attention to
facilitate consumer awareness, as reflected in the requirement that
manufacturers must include this notice on the device when possible or in
the owner’s manual.54 Notably, the standard does not impose an absolute
prohibition on causing interference; rather, it prohibits “harmful
While manufacturers are not required to provide
interference.”55
clarification to consumers, the FCC regulations define “harmful
interference” as “[a]ny emission, radiation or induction that endangers the
functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or
seriously
degrades,
obstructs
or
repeatedly
interrupts
a
50

See, e.g., iGo Stowaway Bluetooth Keyboard Owner’s Manual, available at
http://corporate.igo.com/support/Download%20Support/PPC/En/om/Stowaway%20Bluet
ooth%20for%20PPC%20Owner%20Manual_US.pdf; Yamaha mLan Expansion Board
Owner’s Manual, available at
http://www2.yamaha.co.jp/manual/pdf/emi/english/synth/mLAN16E2_en_om_a0.pdf.
51
47 C.F.R. § 15.105(b).
52
See infra Part II.D.
53
47 C.F.R. § 15.19(a)(3).
54
See id. § 15.19(a)(5).
55
See id. § 15.19(3); see also R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getting Better
Reception from the FCC’s Spectrum Policy, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 25 (2004)
(emphasis added).
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radiocommunications service operating in accordance with this chapter.”56
The FCC regulations do not define what constitutes “degrades,”
“obstructs,” or “repeatedly interferes.”57 Further, no court has addressed
whether the definition is overly vague.58 Thus, consumers face both
incomplete information and a vague legal standard when determining
whether a device is causing harmful interference. Further, consumers
must accept any interference, including harmful interference, as a
condition of operating devices.59 Interference could cause degradation of
performance, connectivity, or range of the wireless broadband
equipment.60
[15] Two duties of the consumer when operating an unlicensed device—
to avoid causing harmful interference and to accept any interference—are
augmented by two additional constraints given in the regulations but not
mandated in the labeling and consumer notification requirements. First,
under the general requirements for operation, the consumer does not
receive or possess a “vested or recognizable right to continued use of any
given frequency” on the basis of device certification or use.61 Being the
owner of the device does not guarantee the consumer exclusive,
continuous, or ongoing usage of that wireless device at a specific
frequency.62 Although a consumer may operate an unlicensed wireless
device for weeks, months, or years, this operation does not confer a firstin-time “vested” right to continue to operate the device if another licensed
or unlicensed device begins to operate at that frequency.63 Applying a
property rights framework to the spectrum, the FCC essentially grants the
consumer permissive usage rights but does not allow the consumer to
claim a per se right to spectrum possession or access simply because the
unlicensed wireless device complies with 47 C.F.R. § 15.64 This lack of
56

47 C.F.R. § 15.3(m).
See Margie, supra note 55, at ¶ 27.
58
See id. ¶ 28 (stating that the FCC and courts have not expanded on the “harmful
interference” standard).
59
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19(a)(3).
60
See Margie, supra note 55, ¶ 1.
61
47 C.F.R. § 15.5(a).
62
See id.
63
See id. § 15.5(a)-(c).
64
Cf. Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & Econ. 529, 532 n.8 (1998) (reviewing
spectrum rights in the context of a radio spectrum).
57
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affirmative spectrum rights assures that licensees are protected from
harmful interference and permits shared spectrum access by allowing
multiple unlicensed devices within a specific frequency band.
[16] The second requirement of 47 C.F.R. § 15 relevant to consumers, but
not mandated by the labeling or notification requirements, is related to
enforcement authority. Specifically, the regulations clarify who is
authorized to require consumers to cease device operations and under what
circumstances they may exercise such authority.65 For most consumer
devices, the current mandatory labeling and notification requirements
neither explicitly instruct the consumer to cease operation if the device
causes harmful interference, nor identify the appropriate authority to
enforce the duty of non-harmful interference.66 The information merely
warns the consumer that operation of the device is “subject to” a
restriction against harmful interference; thus, the duty to cease operations
in the event of harmful interference is only implicit.67 Further, there is no
required language to inform the consumer what constitutes sufficient
notice of harmful interference.68 As a result, a consumer may be uncertain
whether notification by a neighbor or other non-FCC entity constitutes
sufficient notification to require the consumer to cease operation when
such a party asserts that the consumer’s device is causing harmful
interference.
[17] The regulations, however, clearly indicate that the appropriate
authority is the FCC: “[t]he operator of a radio frequency device shall be
required to cease operating the device upon notification by a Commission
representative that the device is causing harmful interference. Operation
shall not resume until the condition causing the harmful interference has
been corrected.”69 The operator of an interfering device is not required to
stop using the device until notified by the FCC; thus, enforcement issues
are raised when other parties provide notice of interference.70
[18]

Thus, consumers have a legal duty to cease operation of an

65

See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(c).
See id. §§ 15.5(c), 15.19(a)(3).
67
See id. § 15.19(a)(3).
68
See id.
69
Id. § 15.5(c).
70
See id.
66
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unlicensed wireless device when it causes harmful interference to licensed
devices and services or as otherwise specified by the FCC.71 In addition,
unlicensed devices must accept interference from other licensed and
unlicensed devices, even if the device becomes inoperable.72 Although a
manufacturer may certify and sell a device as compliant with 47 C.F.R. §
15, the consumer ultimately bears the burden of eliminating harmful
interference or resolving any interference that impairs the proper
functioning of the device.73 Accordingly, even if an unlicensed device
meets technical compliance standards, the regulations require interference
correction on an individual consumer basis.74
D. CONSUMER REMEDIES WHEN UNLICENSED WIRELESS DEVICES
CAUSE INTERFERENCE
[19] Should a consumer’s unlicensed wireless device create harmful
interference, the consumer faces five options: (1) self-correction, (2)
product return, (3) warranty, (4) after-market resale or recycling, and (5)
consumer complaint to the FCC. The first option, mentioned explicitly in
the owner’s manual for a wireless broadband device, encourages the
consumer to attempt to correct the interference by: a) reorienting the
device or its receiving antenna; b) increasing the distance between the
interfering device and other devices; c) connecting the equipment into a
different circuit than that used by the receiver; or d) consulting the dealer
or an experienced technician for further assistance.75 These FCC
recommendations aim to reduce harmful interference so that unlicensed
devices comply with the regulations and are permissible to operate.76
Self-correction of interference, however, merely provides conventional
procedures for prescriptive relief rather than an external remedy.77 If the
device causes harmful interference and the consumer is unable to mitigate
the interference, the consumer must stop using the device.78
71

See id.
Id. § 15.5(b).
73
See id. § 15.5(c).
74
See id.
75
See id. § 15.105(b) (providing explicit text for inclusion in device owner’s manuals
related to how consumers may abate or attempt to correct interference).
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
See id. § 15.5(c).
72
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[20] The second option is to return the device to the place of purchase for
a refund or replacement. This option may be less desirable because it
requires that consumer product returns adhere to state law, retailer terms,
specified timeframes for return, and possible restocking fees.79 This
remedy is of limited value to a consumer who discovers harmful
interference after the window of product return has passed and is unable to
resolve interference by following the FCC recommendations.
[21] The third option assumes that an express or implied product warranty
may protect the consumer. This option, however, is unlikely to cover
product return or replacement where there is no material or workmanship
defect that renders the device noncompliant with 47 C.F.R. § 15.80
Consider a consumer’s device that is causing interference and is no longer
lawful to operate under the regulations. So long as the interfering device
meets minimal technical performance standards and is certified by the
FCC for sale and use in the marketplace, it is unlikely that the FCC will
require the dealer or manufacturer to provide a remedy to the consumer.
Rather, the duty is on the consumer, as the operator of the device, to
correct and resolve any interference problems.81
[22] The FCC regulations foresee potential interference risks, explicitly
warn the consumer that operation of the device is subject to interference
constraints, and ultimately shift the financial burden of device operation
from manufacturers to consumers.82 Therefore, in the absence of an FCCmandated remedy for product recalls, the manufacturer has no duty and
little incentive to provide consumers with a refund for a compliant device
that receives or causes harmful interference on an isolated basis.83 For a
warranty claim, the consumer would need to demonstrate that the product
79

See, e.g., Apple Sales and Refunds Policy, available at
http://store.apple.com/Catalog/US/Images/salespoliciesEdIndividual.html.
80
See U.C.C. § 2-719 (1998) (remedies are available to the buyer for non-conforming
goods).
81
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(c).
82
See id. § 15.19(a)(3); see also id. § 15.5(c) (warning that an operator must cease
operating a device that causes harmful interference).
83
See James T. O’Reilly, Product Recalls & the Third Restatement: Consumers Lose
Twice from Defects in Products and in the Restatement Itself, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 883,
884, 888-91 (2003) (discussing the processes and incentives for product recalls, including
the lack of incentives for manufacturers to compensate consumers in the absence of
government-mandated recalls).
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violates the technical performance standards of device certification and is
consequently no longer compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 15.84 This policy
reflects the expectation that consumers are in the appropriate position to
absorb the marketplace costs arising from occasional interference through
additional purchases of non-interfering wireless devices. This expectation
is based on the following assumptions: 1) the FCC’s light regulatory
approach benefits consumers by lowering overall costs for unlicensed
wireless devices; and 2) better replacement technologies will gradually
provide broader interference correction in the marketplace, fuel
competition, encourage innovation, and generate more product options.
[23] Pursuant to the fourth option, after-market resale, the consumer may
sell the device with the hope of recouping costs.85 The presumption is that
another consumer would be subject to different environmental factors,
such as a further distance from incompatible devices, which would allow
the device to operate legally and correctly. This option may provide only
partial financial compensation. Further, resale shifts the risks to another
consumer rather than to other market actors who may be better able to
absorb the costs.86 These actors could include manufacturers, retailers,
and technology companies that provide wireless broadband services
through unlicensed devices.
[24] Consumers’ fifth option is to file a complaint with the FCC, seeking
investigation and enforcement action against the party operating the
interfering device. Because the owner of an unlicensed device must
accept the risks of any interference, the owner will not likely be successful
unless the interfering device is an unlawful black-market device.
Consumers can also file complaints with the FCC against manufacturers or
retailers, but consumers will likely receive little to no redress.87
84

See, e.g., Motorola, Software License, Warranty, Safety, and Regulatory Information
Broadband Home Networking Products, available at
http://broadband.motorola.com/consumers/products/BR700/downloads/BR700_Warranty
.pdf.
85
See, e.g., eBay: Sell, http://sell.ebay.com/sell (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
86
See, e.g., BLUETOOTH MUSIC GATEWAY USER GUIDE 12, available at
http://www.kyocerawireless.com/support/pdf/wireless-music-gateway-user-guide.pdf.
87
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC HAS MADE SOME
PROGRESS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM BUT FACES
LIMITATIONS, AND ADDITIONAL ACTIONS ARE NEEDED 1 (2008), available at
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According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office Report on FCC
enforcement measures released in February 2008, the FCC does a poor job
of resolving consumer complaints and rarely pursues enforcement
actions.88 FCC Field Office officials in the Spectrum Enforcement
Division, which has oversight of unlicensed consumer wireless devices,
assert that the majority of investigations do not lead to enforcement action
because FCC rules were not violated.89 Yet, when tracking consumer
complaints, the FCC’s internal database frequently omits the outcome or
the reason why the complaint was closed.90
[25] As of 2004, FCC enforcement letters no longer recommend that
consumers contact manufacturers to request their voluntary cooperation
when seeking relief.91 The current letters include a reminder to the
consumer that they must uphold their duty to correct harmful
interference.92 The 2004 revisions also added a warning to the consumer
that failure to correct the problem or cease using the device may result in
an FCC violation and fine.93
[26] Thus, contractual, marketplace, and regulatory enforcement remedies
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08125.pdf [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE REPORT].
88
See id. at 7, 21.
89
See id. at 34.
90
Id.
91
Compare, e.g., FCC Enforcement Letters (Dec. 27, 2004),
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/ plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/alarm-12-24-04.html
(omitting any reference to manufacturers and consistent with other letters since 2004),
with Letter from Sharon Bowers, Deputy Chief, Consumer & Governmental Affairs
Bureau, to Keith F. Higginbotham (June 2, 2003),
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/cordlessspeakerphone-03-06-02.html (“Manufacturers will often bear some of this responsibility
as a courtesy to their customers. We encourage the parties and manufacturers involved
to voluntarily resolve this matter without FCC intervention.”).
92
See FCC Enforcement Letters (Dec. 27, 2004),
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/FCC_enforcement/part-15/alarm-12-24-04.html.
93
See, e.g., FCC Enforcement Letters (Jan. 30, 2007),
http://www.arrl.org/tis/info/HTML/plc/ FCC_enforcement/part-15/unknown-device-0701-30.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) (“While the FCC has confidence that most people
are able to resolve these issues voluntarily, the FCC wants to make you aware that this
unresolved problem may be a violation of FCC rules and could result in a monetary
forfeiture (fine) for each occurrence.”).
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may provide protections for consumers when a device becomes
inoperable. Although pragmatic, the protections are largely limited. The
remedies reflect public policy choices as to who should bear the risks and
costs of technological innovation. To date, the public policy strategy
prioritizes interference prevention through device certification, regulatory
oversight, and the channeling of financial risks to the consumer.94 The
strategy has proven successful thus far because innovative consumer
electronics at bargain basement prices make it reasonably inexpensive for
consumers to replace interfering devices with newer technologies. New
technologies, however, may challenge this cost-based presumption. The
increasingly sophisticated and complex components of emergent
technologies and the convergence of technologies may result in higherpriced devices. Part IV of this article discusses the channeling of financial
risks to consumers in greater detail and analyzes its relation to emergent
technologies and the proliferation of black-market devices. Part V
discusses whether to modify underlying public policy and regulatory
approaches that channel financial risks to consumers.
III. R EGULATION OF W IRELESS C ONSUMER D EVICE R EGULATION IN
C ANADA AND THE E UROPEAN U NION
[27] This section compares the U.S. approach to consumers’ rights and
responsibilities when operating wireless broadband devices with the
regulatory approaches of Canada and the European Union. A comparison
of the U.S. approach with these jurisdictions is beneficial because each has
adopted, with some modifications, international standards under the
auspices of the International Electrotechnical Commission95 that are
similar to the domestic standards imposed by 47 C.F.R. § 15.96 The EU
94

See MANASI DESHPANDE & DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF, AN ECONOMIC STRATEGY FOR
INVESTING IN AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 31-32 (2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/07_infrastructure_elmendorf/07
_infrastructurestrat_elmendorf.pdf (encouraging more flexibility in the FCC’s policy of
interference prevention).
95
See International Electrotechnical Commission: Members of the IEC,
http://www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=102:5:0::::FSP_LANG_ID:25
96
See, e.g., Manual for Dell Wireless LAN Adapter: Model TM1100PC, available at
http://support.euro.dell.com/support/edocs/network/079nk/declare.htm (featuring similar
compliance statements that reference the limitation or prevention of interference: 47
C.F.R. § 15 for the United States; Radio Standards Specifications RSS-210 for Canada;
and the European Telecommunications Standard ETS 300.328).
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and Canadian regulatory approaches and consumer protections differ from
those in the United States in several specific ways. The EU and Canadian
approaches purport different definitions for what constitutes a
“residential” environment. They also permit different amounts and types
of marketing of non-residential equipment to residential consumers,
labeling and consumer notification requirements, and threshold standards
for interference. All three jurisdictions, however, lack legal protections
for consumers whose devices become inoperable or unlawful due to
harmful interference after the permissible time period to return a product
for a refund has passed.
A. MARKETING INDUSTRIAL DEVICES TO CONSUMERS FOR USE IN
RESIDENTIAL ENVIRONMENTS
[28] Device regulations vary slightly across jurisdictions based on
whether the consumer intends to use the device in a residential or
industrial location, what constitutes a “residential” environment, and when
companies may market certain technologies to consumers. The regulation
of devices for residential environments has become increasingly important
and complicated as lower equipment costs make commercial-grade
wireless technologies more attractive to home consumers, neighborhood
groups, and municipalities, and as mobile wireless devices allow
consumers high-speed broadband access from locations outside the
home.97 The U.S. regulatory approach focuses on managing interference
and divides permissible marketing activities into two categories: consumer
devices and all other devices (based on the presumption of use in
residential or non-residential locations).98 This approach prohibits
manufacturers from marketing industrial-grade devices to U.S. consumers
but does not preclude commercial clients from purchasing or using
consumer-grade devices.99
[29] The European Union similarly distinguishes between consumer and
97

See, e.g., Vivato Indoor & Outdoor Wi-Fi Base Stations, available at
http://www.vivato.net/downloads/VP12001210%20Datasheet.pdf (advertising an
unlicensed Class B wireless modem for use indoors or mounted on the building's exterior
for connectivity outdoors).
98
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.3(h)-(i) (2008).
99
See id. § 2.803; see also id. §§ 15.101(a), 15.107, 15.109 (listing the devices and their
authorization, frequency, and radiation emission requirements).
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industrial devices for regulatory purposes but imposes no marketing
prohibitions.100 For example, the European Union neither requires
demonstration of device compliance before marketing to consumers nor
precludes the marketing of industrial devices for residential purposes.101
Rather, the consumer is warned that the device may cause radio
interference in a residential environment, which may lead to restricted use
of the device.102 Thus, EU consumers are allowed to purchase and operate
industrial wireless devices that are more likely to create interference.
Accordingly, EU consumers assume the increased risk of purchasing nonresidential devices that may become impermissible to operate. In addition,
the EU regulatory approach does not preclude consumers from using
commercial-grade devices when in a non-residential environment.103
Thus, the EU approach recognizes a regulatory distinction between
industrial devices and consumer devices but, unlike the United States, it
does not impose marketing restrictions to preclude sales to consumers.
B. MANDATORY DEVICE LABELING AND CONSUMER NOTIFICATION
[30] The labeling and consumer notification requirements in the European
Union and Canada illustrate two approaches: (a) mandatory labeling and
consumer notification including required notification of general
interference risks, and (b) mandatory device labeling for compliance with
required notification of specific interference risks. Pursuant to the first
approach, the European Union uses mandatory labeling and consumer
notification requirements similar to the FCC approach.104 Manufacturers
100

See generally Council Directive 2004/108, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 24 (EC) (regulating
electromagnetic compatibility of equipment); Council Directive 93/68, 1993 O.J. (L 220)
1 (EC) (describing the restriction or prohibition measures of device marketing where
noncompliance continues).
101
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 4.
102
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9(4) (“Apparatus for which
compliance with the protection requirements is not ensured in residential areas shall be
accompanied by a clear indication of this restriction of use, where appropriate also on the
packaging.”).
103
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 4.
104
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9 (requiring apparatus
identification and instructions). See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N, GUIDE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON THE NEW APPROACH AND THE GLOBAL
APPROACH 44-46 (2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pd
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are required to include text or a graphical mark on the device to indicate
that the product complies with all applicable minimum performance
requirements adopted by standardization bodies,105 as consistent with
European Community directives.106 The European Community also
requires consumer notification related to interference if the product may
cause interference in a domestic environment and places the burden on the
consumer to correct the interference.107 Thus, U.S. and EU consumers
receive information, even if limited and generally post-sale, on device
conformity with minimal performance standards and a general duty of the
consumer to prevent and correct harmful interference.
[31] The second approach, illustrated by Canada’s regulatory approach,
similarly requires manufacturers to test and label devices as compliant
with technical performance standards.108 Canada, however, is increasingly
requiring manufacturers to provide more detailed interference notification
for certain types of devices.109 This notification requirement may be met
solely through the inclusion of text in the owner’s manual.110 For
example, a wireless local-area-network device operating in specific
frequencies must provide a warning in the owner’s manual that the device
may only be used indoors and that operating in specified frequency bands
could cause interference or damage to the consumer’s device.111 This
enhanced notification requirement signals a departure from Canada’s light
regulatory approach to device compliance and consumer notification of

f (discussing labeling requirements, including the requirement that the mark on the device
be at least 5 mm and indelible).
105
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, arts. 8-9 (requiring that devices have
the “CE” mark in text or in graphic form).
106
See Council Directive 93/68, supra note 100, art. 2 (EU) (stating that devices must
have a “CE” mark affixed to it); Council Directive 89/336, annex I, 1989 O.J. (L 139) 19
(EU) (describing the “EC” conformity mark);
107
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, art. 9(4).
108
See Radiocommunication Regulations (Radiocommunication Act), SOR/96-484
(Can.).
109
See, e.g., Radio Standards Specifications RSS-210, Annex 9.5(7) (2007) (Can.)
(requiring information about interference risks in specific frequency bands to be included
in the user manual of local-area-networks).
110
Cf. id.
111
See id. Annex 9.3(2).
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general interference risks.112 Previously, Canada boasted to consumers
that 95% compliance rates could be achieved and interference problems
severely limited through minimal regulatory intervention in product
labeling and an as-needed approach to post-market enforcement.113
Canadian regulators have asserted that a light regulatory approach, based
on technical enforcement, decreases up front regulatory intervention,
lowers costs, and streamlines device certification without unduly affecting
consumer protections.114 Even with increased interference notification
requirements for specific types of devices, Canada limits the labeling and
consumer-notification obligations of manufacturers to the inclusion of
such information in the owner’s manual or on the device.
[32] The European Union, the United States, and Canada are similar in
that they impose no requirements on pre-sale information or external
product packaging and thereby limit consumer access to decision-making
information prior to or at the time of purchase. Accordingly, consumers
generally do not learn of the device’s compliance, operational limitations,
or interference constraints until after they purchase the product. Arguably,
a compliance statement on the external packaging may not serve a
valuable role if consumers expect all devices on the market to meet
minimal technical standards. Information at the point of sale, however,
may be beneficial in helping consumers to understand potential limitations
on the operation of a device and to identify potential black-market
devices.115
C. DUTY OF CONSUMER TO RESPOND TO HARMFUL INTERFERENCE
COMPLAINTS
[33] Similar to the United States, both the European Union and Canada
impose, either explicitly or implicitly, a duty on the consumer to prevent
112

See Radio Standards Specifications RSS-Gen, § 7.1.5 (2007) (Can.) (requiring
notification in the user manual or on the device that the device may not cause and must
accept any interference).
113
See Claude Beaudoin, Indus. Can., Canadian Experience with Supplier’s Declaration
of Conformity (SDoC) in the Telecommunications Sector: Presentation for the WTO
TBT Committee Workshop on Suppliers’ Declaration of Conformity 11-13, 16 (Mar. 21,
2005).
114
See id. at 14-16.
115
See infra Part IV, for a discussion of black market devices.
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harmful interference. The European Community explicitly notifies the
consumer of the duty. In comparison, Canada provides notification to the
consumer of interference risks but fails to inform the consumer of
recommended actions to correct interference.116 All three jurisdictions fail
to inform the consumer of the consequences of continued operation of an
interfering device.
[34] Similar to the FCC approach, the European Union requires
manufacturers to certify wireless broadband devices as meeting minimal
technical performance standards before being sold to consumers and then
imposes a duty on consumers to protect against harmful interference.117
Specifically, the consumer is warned that harmful interference may require
the consumer “to take adequate measures” to abate the interference.118
Similar to the vague U.S. legal standard, the EU standard does not specify
what constitutes “harmful interference.”119 Further, the word “adequate”
is not defined; this creates pragmatic and legal uncertainty for the
consumer and enforcement.120 As a result, both the U.S. and the EU
approaches lack clarity on thresholds of unacceptable interference levels
for unlicensed devices used by the consumer. Unlike the FCC rules and
recommendations for self-correction of interference,121 the EU regulations
do not require manufacturers to suggest steps a consumer might take to
remedy interference.122 Significantly, neither the U.S. nor the EU
regulatory regime requires manufacturers to provide explicit notification
to the consumer of the consequences of inaction and continued operation
of an interfering device.123 Thus, both the United States and the European
Union first rely on product conformity with technical standards. They
then transfer the responsibility of noninterference to the consumer,
including the duty to cease operation if the consumer is unable to correct
the interference.
116

See infra notes 122-124.
Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100, arts. 3-5, annex I.
118
See generally Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100 (mentioning “harmful
interference” but failing to include a definition in Article 2).
119
See generally id. (showing that “adequate” is not included in the definition section of
Article 2).
120
See id.; 47 C.F.R. § 1.907 (2008) (defining the term “harmful interference”).
121
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
122
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100.
123
See Council Directive 2004/108, supra note 100; see also supra Part II.B.
117
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[35] Canadian consumers similarly have a duty under national regulations
to cease operations if there is interference, even when the device is fully
compliant.124 Despite the absence of notification with the product,
consumers must take measures to correct interference caused by compliant
devices. When a consumer fails to mitigate the harmful interference in
response to a complaint, a government inspector may conduct an
investigation and determine what measures should be taken.125 Should a
consumer fail to comply with the appropriate recommended measures,
such as ceasing to use the device, the consumer will be subject to
imprisonment and a financial penalty for each additional day of
noncompliance and continued operation of an interfering device.126 Thus,
the Canadian approach follows the U.S. and EU approach to interference
prevention through device certification, but it does not impose a duty on
manufacturers to inform consumers that they must take action to eliminate
interference or of the consequences related to a failure to act in such
instances.
[36] All three jurisdictions provide limited or no information to
consumers at the point of sale to inform them of their duty to avoid
harmful interference. In spite of this, the countries impose such a duty on
consumers and subject them to legal action if they do not uphold this
Even when consumers receive information about whose
duty.127
responsibility it is to resolve interference, they receive little, if any,
information about what constitutes harmful interference, which
circumstances require the cessation of device operation, and consequences
of continued use. Accordingly, there is a gap between what manufacturers
have told consumers pursuant to regulatory requirements and what
consumers are required to know about interference mitigation
requirements, the potential risks associated with devices, and their right to
operate such devices.

124

See Radiocommunication Regulations (Radiocommunication Act), SOR/96-484
(Can.).
125
See id. § 52(1).
126
See Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., ch. R-2, §§ 9-10 (1985) (Can.) (implementing
either a fine that does not exceed five thousand dollars for an individual or imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year).
127
See discussion Parts II.D, III.B-C.
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D. COST-SHIFTING TO CONSUMERS WHEN WIRELESS CONSUMER DEVICES
CAUSE INTERFERENCE
[37] Similar to the United States, the European Union and Canada
recognize pragmatic and contractual remedies for consumers when
unlicensed wireless devices become unlawful to operate due to harmful
interference, but these jurisdictions ultimately shift the costs to the
consumer if those remedies are unsuccessful.128 The consumer’s remedies
are largely dependent upon self-correction of interference, product return,
product warranty, and resale (discussed in section II of this article).
Although jurisdictions vary slightly in how they implement these
remedies,129 consumers in all jurisdictions must absorb the financial loss
when a device that is deemed compliant causes harmful interference.130 In
such situations, the consumer must stop using the device. Consequently,
consumers in all three jurisdictions generally lack legal remedies for
financial compensation when a compliant device becomes inoperable or
unlawful to operate beyond the window for product return.131
IV. P OTENTIAL I NTERFERENCE T HREATS TO C ONSUMER D EVICES
[38] The rapidly evolving wireless landscape raises issues of spectrum
coexistence policies to permit traditional and emergent technologies to
proliferate in shared spectrum frequencies. Inherent problems with
addressing this issue include the difficulty of determining the
compatibility and coexistence of technologies and increased risks of
interference. Interference risks arise from an increase in the number of
unlicensed devices, a greater range of devices, and the proliferation of

128

Graham Longford, Presentation on Open Spectrum and Community Wireless
Networking in Canada: a Preliminary Review of the Policy and Regulatory Landscape 67 (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://www.cwirp.ca/publications.php) (discussing the lack
of protections for Canadian consumers when harmful interference occurs); see also
Jennifer S. Martin, An Emerging Worldwide Standard for Protections of Consumers in
the Sale of Goods: Did We Miss an Opportunity with Revised UCC Article 2?, 41 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 223, 240-42, 255-56 (2006) (discussing EU and Canadian contract law).
129
See Martin, supra note 128, at 240-42, 255-56 (contrasting EU and Canadian contract
law).
130
Id.
131
See id.; U.C.C. § 2-719 (1998).
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mobile wireless devices.132 This section discusses emergent interference
threats posed by different technologies operating at the same location and
black-market devices and how these interference threats impact consumer
protections.
A. DIFFERENT WIRELESS BROADBAND TECHNOLOGIES OPERATING IN ONE
LOCATION
[39] Multiple wireless infrastructure technologies and the growing variety
of devices operating in one location are increasing the potential for
interference across devices and technologies.133 Interference concerns are
exacerbated in high-density urban and residential environments where the
likelihood of the number of devices operating within a given area
increases and the distance between devices decreases.134 The vast quantity
and different types of interference sources have raised concerns about
adequate prevention of harmful interference before technologies become
widespread in the marketplace,135 effective enforcement to protect
132

See Robert Lemos, Got Interference? Data-Crowding Problems Loom for Wi-Fi,
WIRED, July 17, 2007, available at
http://www.wired.com/gadgets/wireless/news/2007/07/wifi_interference (discussing
increasing sources of interference from overlapping municipal, neighborhood, residential
wireless networks, and the myriad of residential electronics); Paul G. Schreier, Spectrum
Analyzers Respond to Digital Modulation, TEST & MEASUREMENT WORLD, June 2007, at
45, available at http://www.tmworld.com/contents/pdf/6447664.pdf (identifying a trend
towards greater interference among wireless consumer devices across wider frequency
ranges and from a dramatic increase in signal sources).
133
See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parekh & David Tse, Spectrum Sharing for Unlicensed Bands,
25 IEEE J. ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMS. 517, 517 (2007), available at
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~nikhils/gtpres/repeatedgame-spectrumsharing.pdf
(concluding that interference may cause unfair and inefficient outcomes for consumers as
determined by a hypothetical urban scenario of multiple wireless systems operating in the
same band); Gadi Singer, Chief Tech. Officer, Intel Corp., Abstract, Presentation on
Communication Infrastructure from Vision to Reality (Oct. 25, 2004) (asserting that no
single technology – 3G, UWB, Wi-Fi and WiMax – will become dominant and thus a
combination of technologies must coexist).
134
See Lemos, supra note 132 (discussing interference in high-density environments with
overlapping wireless infrastructures).
135
See Joint Reply Comments of the Ass’n for Maximum Serv. Television, Inc. and the
Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters at iii, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast Bands,
Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band,
ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter MSTV & NAB Joint Reply
Comments] (concluding that laboratory device testing inadequately addresses
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licensees when harmful interference occurs,136 and spectrum
congestion.137 These issues can directly impact consumers because they
threaten to degrade the performance of wireless broadband devices and
may require consumers to stop using devices. These issues also suggest a
possible increase in the number of consumer disputes, which currently
lack adequate dispute-resolution mechanisms.138 Thus, greater numbers of
wireless broadband technologies operating at the same location may result
in more consumers being burdened with devices that require updates or
require that consumers replace such devices with non-interfering devices.
Such changes are likely to be at the consumer’s expense and may be more
frequent due to rapidly changing technologies.
B. BLACK-MARKET DEVICES: UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE
[40] The major difficulties with increased market penetration of blackmarket devices arise from two dependent factors: detection and

marketplace conditions and that the FCC should not allow unlicensed devices in licensed
spectrum due to unacceptable interference risks to commercial services); see also Reply
Comments of MSTV and NAB to the OET Report on the Performance of Prototype TVBand White Space Devices at 6-8, In re Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broadcast
Bands, Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz
Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380 (Aug. 27, 2007) (stating that unlicensed
personal/portable devices ineffectively prevent harmful interference to the television
spectrum). But see IEEE-USA Board of Directors, Improving Spectrum Usage Through
Cognitive Radio Technology (Nov. 13, 2003),
http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/cognitiveradio.asp (asserting that innovative
technologies can facilitate temporal and geographical sharing of spectrum in the future).
136
See MSTV & NAB Joint Reply Comments, supra note 135, at 7-18 (recommending
that the FCC implement protections should unlicensed consumer devices be allowed to
operate in licensed broadcast spectrum); MSTV Lobbies Against Unlicensed Devices,
BROADCAST ENGINEERING, Dec. 18, 2006, available at
http://broadcastengineering.com/RF/mstv-against-unlicensed-devices1218/ (spotlighting
MSTV’s concerns with FCC enforcement should a product become widespread and with
the lengthy process for product recalls).
137
Lemos, supra note 132 (discussing how consumers may find too many users operating
within the same location and thus experience degraded device performance and Internet
connectivity).
138
See Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 684-86 (2005) (discussing how increasingly rival unlicensed
spectrum users are looking for dispute mechanisms).
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enforcement.139 First, the black-market device must be detected and
identified by the consumer at or before the point of sale or when a
consumer device is subject to interference from an unlawful black-market
device.140 At the point of sale, a U.S. consumer’s attempt to identify a
black-market device is frustrated by the lack of mandatory requirements
for external product packaging.141 After purchase, the consumer will
likely find that black-market devices do not abide by labeling and
consumer notification requirements, or technical standards for power
limits and frequency emissions.142 As such, the lack of mandatory
external product packaging requirements may frustrate the consumer’s
initial decision to purchase only lawful devices and may result in a
consumer unknowingly purchasing and operating an unlawful device that
causes harmful interference.
[41] Although a consumer operating a compliant wireless device must
accept most interference, the consumer still has legal rights against
interference caused by unlawful black-market devices.143 The consumer,
however, is unlikely to possess the knowledge or sophisticated equipment
required to detect and confirm that the interference is caused by an
unlawful black-market device. Accordingly, the ability to detect and
identify interference from a black-market device is limited by consumer
awareness, technical ability to identify unlawful devices, and dependency
on other market actors (including regulators) for black-market prevention,
detection, and enforcement.

139

See Press Release, Indus. Can., Buyer Beware: Industry Canada Cautions Canadians
Against Buying Illegal Satellite Systems (Dec. 17, 2002) (on file with author), available
at http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/ic1.nsf/en/02624e.html (warning consumers of unlawful
black-market direct-to-home satellite devices, providing a checklist for consumers when
purchasing these devices, and informing the consumers of legal consequences of
unlawful device operation and risks of “useless” equipment).
140
See id.
141
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.19 (2008) (requiring labels for compliant devices on the item itself,
and, for devices too small for the label, allowing the manufacturer to choose whether to
place the label in the device manual or on external packaging).
142
Press Release, Indus. Can., supra note 139.
143
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5 (stating that a FCC representative can require a device no longer
be used if it is causing harmful interference).
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V. CONSUMER PROTECTION MECHANISMS
[42] Thus far, the FCC’s light regulatory approach to evolving wireless
technologies has fostered the proliferation of low-cost, unlicensed wireless
devices and achieved social and public policy goals to increase consumer
choice and a robust marketplace.144 In its consideration of how to make
more broadband services available to consumers, the Task Force
recommended continuing this trend through voluntary cooperation across
industry actors and consumers using unlicensed wireless devices.145 It is
unclear, however, whether a solely voluntary approach to spectrum
coordination and interference management will adequately protect
consumers’ interests, particularly in light of emergent interference
concerns, weak enforcement mechanisms, and cost-shifting to the
consumer when devices become unlawful to operate. Thus, this section
examines the advantages, disadvantages, and limitations of possible
marketplace, regulatory, and legal reforms designed to enhance
protections for U.S. consumers operating unlicensed wireless broadband
devices in licensed and unlicensed spectrum.
A. MARKETPLACE SOLUTIONS: VOLUNTARY COOPERATION AND
CONSUMER EDUCATION
[43] Key industry associations and technology proponents support the
Task Force’s recommended laissez-faire approach to the effective
management of interference issues. A voluntary approach allows
manufacturers, industry stakeholders, and consumers to choose which
144

See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 30 (2002) (referring to the rapid growth of consumer equipment and how this
enables low-cost solutions of social benefit through open networks); see also OFFICE OF
COMMC’NS, DIGITAL DIVIDEND REVIEW: A STATEMENT ON OUR APPROACH TO
AWARDING THE DIGITAL DIVIDEND 3 (2007), available at
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/ddr/statement/statement.pdf (“Wireless
services are now widely available at low cost, to the benefit of both individuals and
society as a whole.”); Press Release, Commc’ns Research Ctr. Can., CRC Highlights
2006-2007: Building Next Generation Communications Technologies for Canada,
available at
http://www.crc.ca/en/html/crc/home/info_crc/publications/highlights_0607/highlights_06
07 (highlighting that wireless standards foster low-cost wireless equipment and will
enable broadband access in rural areas of Canada in 2009).
145
See WIRELESS BROADBAND ACCESS TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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technologies and services will dominate, thus promoting market-based
technical innovation.146 Specifically, the groups advocate for the use of
private self-certification efforts by manufacturers, private disputeresolution mechanisms, technical solutions, and preventative consumer
education.147 As an example of the self-certification approach, the Wi-Fi
Alliance asserts that its private testing program protects the interests of
“both the consumer and the industry.”148 The Wi-Fi Alliance allows
participating manufacturers to include the Wi-Fi Alliance-certified logo on
product packaging to help consumers identify reliable products.149 The
Wi-Fi Alliance website does not indicate whether the Wi-Fi Alliance has
ever initiated an enforcement action nor does it specify whether
information about enforcement against manufacturers would be made
public.150 The Wi-Fi Alliance serves as an example of how industry selfcertification programs can create market benefits through decreased
regulatory costs, potentially lower device costs for consumers, and
improved product branding to help guide consumer choices. In the
absence of effective dispute-resolution mechanisms and transparency of
enforcement actions, however, consumer benefits remain limited.
[44] With respect to market-based technical solutions, technology
advocates have proposed various technologies and methods that allow
devices to dynamically share permissible frequencies or to operate within
limited geographical areas.151 Organizations, such as the National
146

See generally Comments of the Wireless Commc’ns Ass’n Int’l, Inc., In re
Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission’s Rules for Unlicensed Devices and
Equipment Approval, ET Docket No. 03-201 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at
http://wcai.com/images/pdf/fcc_oct15.pdf.
147
Id. at 2 (“WCA continues to support voluntary frequency coordination and other ‘best
practices’ among unlicensed users, approaches that do not undermine the flexibility and
technological innovation that has been critical to the success of unlicensed services over
the past decade.”).
148
See Jeffrey Silva, M2M Companies Ask for Spectrum Etiquette as More Unlicensed
Devices Come to Market, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Oct. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20071026/SUB/71026017/M2M-companies-ask-forspectrum-etiquette-as-more-unlicensed-devices-come-to-market.
149
See Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 138, at 678-79 (noting the Wi-Fi Alliance is worth
considering but recognizing that it is still too early to assess its effectiveness at
enforcement).
150
See Wi-Fi Alliance Website, http://www.wi-fi.org (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
151
See Comments of the Nat’l Telecommunications and Info. Admin. at 39-43, In re
Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum Use Employing
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Telecommunications and Information Administration, assert that lower
regulatory burdens promote new market entrants, responsiveness to
technological changes, and consumer benefits by enhancing product
choices.152 The emerging technologies, however, are criticized as
unproven,153 questionably effective,154 difficult to certify for
noninterference,155 and easy to alter.156 These technologies are also
burdened by internalized bargaining costs as consumers work out
acceptable congestion levels for those operating unlicensed devices.157
Further, these technologies may render equipment more costly due to
increased complexity in software programming and product
development.158
[45] Consumer education has also been seen as a valuable market-based
activity to promote best practices by industry and consumers to minimize
David Case, a senior
interference in residential environments.159
regulatory engineer for Cisco Systems Inc., believes that because “the
consumer ultimately ends up with the problem. . . . [t]he only solution at
this time is better consumer education.”160 He asserts that because retail
Cognitive Radio Technologies, ET Docket No. 03-108 (Feb. 15, 2005) (describing
compliance measurements for interruptible radio, listen-before-talk, and geolocation
technologies).
152
Id. at viii.
153
See id. at 18 (discussing the lack of maturity of the sensing and geolocation techniques
supported by software-defined radio and cognitive radio technologies).
154
See OFFICE OF COMMUC’NS, TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH PROGRAMME: RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT AT OFCOM 2005/06, at 13 (2006) (highlighting that CR technologies may
be unable to detect “hidden” primary users due to receive-only devices or unfavorable
“propagation” conditions).
155
See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parekh & David Tse, supra note 133, at 517.
156
See id.
157
See Thomas W. Hazlett & Matthew L. Spitzer, Advanced Wireless Technologies and
Public Policy, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 595, 664 (2006) (examining the regulatory proposal to
impose new unlicensed spectrum allocations, rejecting the “commons” unlicensed
spectrum approach, and asserting beneficial outcomes where unlicensed devices do not
extensively share spectrum in complex ways).
158
But see id. at 656-57.
159
See Denis Kuwahara, Boeing Co., Comments to IC UWB Consultation on IEEE
P802.18 Radio Regulatory – TAG (Apr. 2005) (“Consumer education on the use of
license-exempt devices could do much to eliminate interference.”).
160
David A. Case, Residential Spectrum Management: The Manufacturer’s Role,
COMPLIANCE ENGINEERING, http://www.ce-mag.com/archive/05/01/014.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2008).
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salespeople generally lack sufficient product knowledge to adequately
inform consumers, manufacturers should provide “specific” warnings
inside product packaging which describe interference risks, spectrum
compatibility with competitors’ products, and other devices designed to
operate in the same spectrum.161 Case’s solution, however, is based on
post-sale information provided to consumers. His solution relies on the
presumption that consumers will return a product after receiving such
information.162 Even if the information is provided during the sales cycle,
the all-voluntary approach remains prone to lackluster participation
because companies lack incentives to promote another company’s devices
rather than their own.163 The voluntary approach could also lead to
consumers receiving inconsistent information about a device’s
compatibility with other spectrum-dependent devices.164 Further, the
voluntary warnings may increase manufacturer costs and product prices.165
[46] One solution is for consumer protection groups and the media to
educate and inform consumers.166 Such efforts are limited because they
indirectly impact consumers, whereas manufacturers and retailers directly
enhance consumer awareness by providing information in product

161

Id.
See id.
163
Cf. ELISE GOLAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMICS OF FOOD LABELING 8
(2001) (discussing the limitations to market incentives for voluntary labeling programs,
such as where the labeling by one manufacturer could result in benefits to rivals); Nicole
Darnall, Addressing Global Environmental Challenges: Using Information as a Novel
“Local” Policy Approach, 4 GLOBAL STUD. REV. 1, 2 (2008) (asserting that most
companies would not participate in voluntary-labeling programs for environmental
products).
164
Cf. Darnall, supra note 163, at 2 (concluding that voluntary programs “would not be
useful at providing consumers consistent information to inform their purchasing
decisions”).
165
Cf. Letter from Gregory Jaffe, Co-Director, Biotechnology Project, Center for Science
in the Public Interest, to Dockets Management Branch (HFA-305), Food and Drug
Administration (May 16, 2001), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/biotech/cspi_gepoll.html (stating that consumers are unwilling to
pay higher prices for food labeling).
166
See, e.g., Digital Television Transition (DTV), http://www.dtvtransition.org/ (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) (describing a public-private coalition to educate consumers about
the digital television switchover in the United States in 2009).
162
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enclosures.167 Voluntary consumer education could provide consumers
additional beneficial information, but market forces alone would be
unlikely to produce optimal consumer education required for effective
interference management. Lastly, voluntary activities neither confer
greater legal protections to consumers when the equipment becomes
inoperable, nor provide greater enforcement mechanisms to ensure the
legal rights associated with licensed services and devices. Thus, an allvoluntary approach to protecting the economic interests of licensees and
the property rights of consumers in their devices may yield inefficient and
unfair outcomes.168
B. REGULATORY SOLUTIONS: RULES, OUTREACH, AND EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
[47] A second solution is to improve and enhance the FCC’s regulatory
activities to protect consumers by providing better labeling and
notification requirements, educational programs, increased clarity in
interference standards, and enhanced regulatory oversight of compliance
and enforcement.169 First, the FCC could amend its labeling and
notification requirements to require notice before or at the point of sale.170
This additional requirement could augment, rather than replace, the
existing requirements to provide notification inside the packaging or
through electronic notification.
[48] Second, to limit the imposition on manufacturing companies and
dealers to provide plain English rules relevant to consumers, the FCC
could conduct a consumer education campaign to communicate the

167

See 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(k) (2008) (requiring sellers of analog televisions without
digital tuners to provide a conspicuous “Consumer Warning Alert” on the equipment at
the point of sale).
168
See Raul Etkin, Abhay Parek & David Tse, supra note 133, at 517 (pointing to
mathematical modeling of transmitters and receivers in a fixed system to ascertain that
the asymmetries and selfish behavior in a voluntary system of spectrum noninterference
management contribute to inefficient solutions).
169
Cf. GOLAN ET AL., supra note 163, at 13-18 (discussing the reasons, costs, and benefits
of mandatory labeling as a policy tool).
170
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(k) (requiring a conspicuous “Consumer Alert” to be
placed on the screen or on top of analog televisions that lack digital tuners, prior to sale).
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advantages and limitations of unlicensed devices.171 The campaign could
help consumers understand which factors are significant before choosing
an unlicensed device.172 Third, the FCC could clarify technical standards
for interference (such as according to each type of device) and elaborate
on the legal definition of harmful interference for consumer-operated
devices. 173 The current vague standard offers flexibility but also leads to
unexpected surprises for consumers. As equipment prices of unlicensed
devices increase, cost-shifting to the consumer and a dearth of remedies
deprive the consumer of adequate market protections. Given that
manufacturers and retailers seek to sell more devices, they have an
incentive to shorten market cycles for equipment replacement and may be
driven by motives contrary to consumer financial interests. As a result,
the FCC should reevaluate the impact of equipment price increases and the
resultant cost-shifting to consumers.
[49] The FCC should continue to take a cautious approach to device
certification, requiring all new devices to comply with noninterference.174
Noninterference testing is particularly important when the device is
intended to operate in shared licensed spectrum,175 or where there is a
potential for interference with existing spectrum uses, such as medical and
astronomy services.176 Lastly, the FCC could provide enhanced complaint
processing and dispute resolution mechanisms.177
171

See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The Digital TV Transition: What You Need to
Know About DTV, http://www.dtv.gov/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) (providing
educational information about the advantages of the digital television transition and about
the DTV equipment available to consumers).
172
See, e.g., FCC Consumer Advisory, Buying the Right TV: What Every Consumer
Should Know (Jan. 3, 2008), http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/dtvlabels.html.
173
See Margie, supra note 55, at ¶¶ 16-29.
174
See generally 47 C.F.R. § 15 (requiring unlicensed devices to comply with rules and
regulations regarding noninterference).
175
See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, The FCC’s Office of Engineering
and Technology Announces the Initiation of Field Testing for Prototype TV White Space
Devices: ET Docket No. 04-186 (July 10, 2008), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-08-1635A1.doc.
176
See, e.g., Letter from Richard Whitt, Washington Telecom & Media Counsel, Google,
to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Sec’y, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n 3 (Mar. 21, 2008)
(proposing a “safe harbor” of spectrum to protect, in part, medical and astronomy devices
and services from interference by unlicensed broadband devices).
177
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 87, at 34-36
(recommending improvement for new processes and accountability of FCC’s
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[50] The disadvantages of a greater regulatory role are three-fold. First,
increased administrative oversight will increase regulatory costs and may
result in higher consumer costs.178 Second, it remains uncertain how to
better certify devices given increasingly complicated hardware and
software device components, and how such re-certification would occur
when newer replacement technologies enter the marketplace.179 Third,
even licensee incumbents may find a lack of efficient and productive
enforcement mechanisms against consumers using interfering devices
after the devices enter the marketplace.180 In such cases, market forces
may provide a better remedy by creating consumer incentives to purchase
replacement equipment.
C. CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION: THE LAST RESORT
[51] The third option is to improve consumer protection laws and
contractual mechanisms to provide a right of product return. As discussed
above, at present, consumers with an interfering device have limited legal
options after the window of time for product returns has passed.
Generally, this is not an issue for lower-cost items. Consumers
historically have replaced technologies on a voluntary, cost-benefit basis,
exchanging older products for newer devices.181 As expensive unlicensed
devices permeate the marketplace, however, the cost-benefit basis
disfavors consumers. Thus, mechanisms may be needed to mitigate
consumer costs when equipment becomes unusable or interference causes
the performance to degrade.

enforcement program due to insufficient resolution of consumer complaints and rarity of
enforcement actions).
178
See GOLAN ET AL., supra note 163, at 16.
179
See Louis E. Frenzel, Complex Wireless Standards Put Instruments to the Test,
ELECTRONIC DESIGN, June 18, 2008,
http://electronicdesign.com/Articles/ArticleID/19010/19010.html (discussing how
increasingly advanced technologies are complicating the testing for regulatory
compliance and interoperability requirements).
180
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 87, at 3, 14 (finding
that FCC enforcement actions are rare).
181
See David S. Joachim, The Word on Warranties: Don’t Bother, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/01/technology/circuits/01warr.html
(discussing how consumers groups advise consumers not to purchase warranties because
prices for replacement electronics keep falling).
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[52] The disadvantage of increasing consumer protections is that it
confers greater rights to the consumers and could be abused to allow
consumers a right of return for any reason, rather than meeting its purpose
of mitigating inoperable or interfering equipment. This could cause costshifting to manufacturers and retailers, which could significantly deter
major technology investments and new product designs.182 Further, the
legislative approach may not adequately respond to technological
innovation.183 New legislation may also impinge on existing licensees’
rights and consumers who pay for wireless services. Moreover, the
legislative approach may foster litigation rather than innovation. Lastly, it
could further impede investment and confidence in emergent technologies.
Thus, increased consumer legislation should be reserved for use only after
other mechanisms are proven to be ineffective at adequately protecting
consumers.
VI. C ONCLUSION
[53] Historically, consumers have benefited from innovative uses of
spectrum and arguably will continue to benefit from increased
technological solutions and a light regulatory approach to unlicensed
consumer devices. Thus far, the impacts to consumers from harmful
interference and inoperable devices have been mitigated by: 1)
interference prevention through FCC-mandated technical standards; 2)
compliance testing; and 3) voluntary consumer action, including efforts to
correct interference and gradual equipment replacement as technologies
evolve to offer more features and capabilities. Emergent wireless
broadband technologies for consumer devices, however, increasingly
challenge traditional notions of spectrum management, when and how
consumers use unlicensed devices, and the cost of those devices.
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Cf. Doug Johnson, Will Legislation Improve Energy Efficiency in Consumer
Products?, ELECTRONICS WKLY., Mar. 12, 2008, available at
http://www.electronicsweekly.com/Articles/2008/03/12/43315/will-legislation-improveenergy-efficiency-in-consumer-products.htm (asserting that a government mandate to
require energy compliance by consumer electronics would “stifle innovation, limit
consumer choice, and interfere with competitive trends”).
183
See PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
450 (2000) (stating that dynamic policy environments, such as computer technology,
require responsive adjustments to avoid market distortions or unnecessary barriers).
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[54] Even though the FCC has now authorized additional spectrum access
for wireless broadband devices, multiple market actors continue to lobby
the FCC for their competing positions. Incumbent licensees, such as
commercial broadcasters and cellular providers, are urging the FCC to
reconsider its position on shared spectrum access and to protect the
financial interests of licensees and consumers of commercial services.184
Technology and equipment companies, such as Google, Microsoft, and
Motorola, continue to promote the consumer benefits of technological
advances, such as increased innovation and equipment choices.185 These
companies also have an implicit motivation to increase online advertising,
fee-based services, and device sales. Consumer advocates have largely
supported the positions of equipment manufacturers and technology
companies because of overall consumer benefits.186
Consumer
advocates, however, have remained silent on implications for consumers
should emergent, unlicensed, wireless broadband devices be deactivated,
recalled, or declared unlawful to operate after purchase.
[55] The FCC’s plan to rely on enhanced certification standards for
wireless broadband devices will play a crucial role in promoting
innovation and marketplace competition, while building confidence in
consumers and other market actors through interference prevention.
Focusing on interference prevention, however, does not address consumer
rights, duties, and remedies should interference occur. Given that
regulatory experimentation is intended to benefit consumers, the FCC
should consider the adequacy of remedies for consumers when devices
cause or suffer from harmful interference, particularly if devices become
more costly for consumers to replace with non-interfering technologies.
184

See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, NAB Statement on Today’s FCC
Ruling on ‘White Spaces’ (Nov. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Press_Releases1&CONTENTID=13447
&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm; Joint Comments in Support of “Emergency
Request,” supra note 19, at 1-6.
185
See, e.g., Olga Kharif, FCC Opens New Airwaves to the Public, BUS. WK., Nov. 5,
2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2008/tc2008115_197440.htm
(“Some within the industry see white-space gear and services taking off as quickly as WiFi, which debuted in 2000.”).
186
See, e.g., Press Release, Pub. Knowledge, Public Interest Organizations Commend
FCC for Boosting Wireless Internet (Nov. 4, 2008), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1850.
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[56] The FCC could also play a role in ensuring consumers understand
the implications of interference enforcement for newer products prior to or
at the point of purchase. This objective could be accomplished through
consumer education campaigns and enhanced information on external
product packaging. Further, the FCC could promote more effective public
and private complaint and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
[57] Consumer advocacy groups should lobby the FCC for greater
inclusion of consumer protections in policy discussions. Increased
advocacy and consumer representation will help ensure adequate
consideration of consumer interests as distinct from other market actors.
Representation of consumer interests is particularly important with respect
to burden-shifting to consumers to resolve harmful interference, technical
proposals to disable or deactivate interfering equipment remotely without
the consumer’s consent or prior notification, privacy safeguards, and
enhanced enforcement and dispute mechanisms.
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